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Abstract 
The paper aims to reconcile different explanations (and consequences) of the motivation crowding theory in a unique 
theoretical framework where the locus of control is introduced in a one period maximisation problem and the intrinsic 
motivation is assumed as an exogenous psychological attitude. The analysis is based on the distinction among different types 
of objectives of the intrinsic motivation. For each type of objective, the different role of self esteem and self determination 
mechanisms determine different conditions for crowding out of intrinsic motivation, depending on the self determination 
sensitivity, its impact on the motivated good and the individual belief about one’s own self. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In psychology the motivation is defined as a dynamic factor that directs behaviour toward an objective. 
According to Geen (1994), motivation refers to the initiation, direction, intensity and persistence of 
human behaviour. The extrinsic motivation operates when someone engages in a particular behaviour 
for purposes that are extrinsic to the behaviour itself, such as to receive praises, awards, good reviews 
or to avoid unpleasant situations, such as a punishment. In Deci et al. 2008 (p. 13) the behaviour 
motivated by extrinsic motivation “entails doing an activity because it leads to some outcome that is 
operationally separable from the activity itself. That is, extrinsic motivation concerns activities enacted 
because they are instrumental rather than because one finds the actions satisfying in their own right”. 
The intrinsic motivation, instead, operates when someone engages in behaviour because he finds the 
activity challenging and rewarding in itself, and he gets satisfaction in enhancing his competence in that 
specific task.  
Two points have to be stressed. First, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is 
based on relation between the activity performed, the individual and the motivation. Second, the 
motivation is a factor that pushes the individual to perform a specific activity.  
Economic theory of human behaviour is based on the hypothesis that individuals behave according to 
the aim of maximising utility by means of the available income. In the logical sequence of economic 
thinking, individual's behaviour (the choice of a specific combination of variables) is the outcome 
resulting by utilizing available means (income) to reach an objective (maximisation of utility function). 
The arguments of the utility function are a list of objective. Which role for motivation? Economic 
literature has devoted some attention to the effect of intrinsic motivation on performances of workers 
and students, to study the crowding out effect of pecuniary incentives (extrinsic motivations) but the 
weight of motivations in economic behaviour could be relevant for many other situations1. Frey and 
Jegen have formalised the crowding out effect in the Motivation crowding theory, but they didn’t 
explain why derivatives representing crowding effects could differ from one person to another and 
from one situation to another (Harvey, 2005). Much empirical evidence on the perverse effects of 
rewards is available: crowding out effects have been detected in supplying working effort (Barkema, 
1995), in reciprocating behaviour (Fehr, Gachter, 2000; Bruni et al., 2009), and in situation where trust 
(Bohnet, Frey, Huck, 2001) or other regarding feelings are involved (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, 1998)2. 
Many authors have stressed the relation between the crowding effect of rewards and the perceived 
control effect. Frey and Jegen (cit.) identify two psychological processes that affect intrinsic 
motivations: impaired self determination and impaired self esteem. Benabou and Tyrole (2003) use the 
“looking glass self” (Cooley, 1902) to show that agent takes the principal’s perspective in order to learn 
about himself. For the authors, the incentives enhance engaging an activity only if they reveal hidden 
information to the agent, about the task or the agent’s talent, enhancing his confidence about himself. 
They stress that "before worrying about the negative impact of rewards, one should first check that the 
reward provider has private information about the task or the agent's talent" (Benabou, Tirole, 2003, 
p.505). An asymmetric information framework is also in Sliwka model (2007), where explanation of 
crowding out is explicitly “distinct from those proposed by psychologist”, and is based on the learning 
of the prevailing social norm, emerging from the incentive scheme proposed by the principal.  
In this general framework, the paper aims to reconcile different explanations (and consequences) of the 
motivation crowding theory in a unique theoretical framework, based on the distinction of four 
categories of objectives of intrinsic motivation. Within each category, the self determination process 
has different effects on behaviour, and different conditions are needed to observe motivation crowding 
out, depending on the kind of motivated good the individual considers. The differences become more 
evident if the self esteem mechanism is also considered.  
                                                 
1 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a discussion about economic issues that could be covered by this topic. 
2 See again Frey and Jegen (2001) for a review of empirical studies on crowding out effects. 
 
To explicitly model the self esteem and self determination mechanisms in motivation crowding, the 
locus of control is introduced in a one period maximisation problem. Throughout the model the 
intrinsic motivation is assumed as an exogenous psychological attitude that can be more or less 
highlighted in economic behaviour. Differently from some previous models, that will be discussed all 
through the paper, the intrinsic motivation is not a matter of economic choice where individuals 
choose to behave as intrinsic (altruistic) or extrinsic (selfish), according to the best payoff they can 
afford.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the following section the economic approach to intrinsic 
motivation and the four categories of intrinsic motivation will be discussed. In section 3, the role of self 
esteem, self determination and locus of control in motivation crowding out are examined. Sections 4, 5, 
6 and 7 show the hypotheses and the results of the model for the different categories of intrinsic 
motivation. Some concluding remarks are reported in section 8. 
 
2. Motivations and the economic theory 
 
Starting from the idea that motivation is a factor that activates and directs human behaviour, one can 
easily classify economic incentives in the category of extrinsic motivations because they act as 
exogenous factors that modify basic individual behaviour. Incentives are exogenous both with respect 
to the activity, both with respect to the reward provider: a principal, differently informed, can induce 
the agent to better performances through the appropriate design of incentives. Other motivations are 
extrinsic if they are provided by someone different from the individual (they are extrinsic with respect 
to the individual), are not a natural output of the activity (they are extrinsic with respect to the activity), 
have an explicit formalisation other than a feeling, which is in turn an intrinsic matter of the individual. 
These characteristics should be present to make a motivation extrinsic.  
On the opposite, any motivation that is endogenous to the individual and/or to her behaviour is 
intrinsic. The effect of the intrinsic motivation is easy to recognize when economic theory predicts a 
very different behaviour: volunteering with a zero wage is an example3. Nevertheless, in many other 
cases it is difficult to “differentiate between different source of motivation, which in the economic view 
are just manifestations of underlying preferences (for the task itself, or for the reward that is associated 
with performing the task)” (Frey, Jegen, 2001, p.591).  
As suggested by Frey and Jegen (2001), it could be useful to consider the two polar cases of purely 
extrinsically and purely intrinsically induced individuals, with a continuous of combination of the two 
motivations in the between. The first type of individual corresponds to the standard agent of the 
economic theory. He gives up time only if is compensated with a pay and he gives up goods only if a 
price is reimbursed. If no intrinsic motivation is at work, only extrinsic motivation directs behaviour 
and a principal can use incentives to modify the agent’s choices because incentives supply more means 
(more income or material goods) to reach the extrinsic goal of getting more goods.  
Purely intrinsically motivated people gives up his time only if he finds the activity pleasant per se and 
gives up goods for donation. He spontaneously reduces the available means needed for getting more 
goods but the emotional welfare has a positive relation with the amount of goods and time one uses for 
this purposes. From this point of view, intrinsic and extrinsic objectives exclude each other.  
Basically, for the intrinsically motivated individual the logical sequence underlying her behaviour is the 
same as the extrinsically motivated one: behaviour (the choice of a specific combination of variables) is 
the outcome resulting from utilizing available means (income) to reach an objective (maximisation of 
an emotional welfare function). The arguments of the emotional welfare function are a list of objective 
which may include pleasure to engage in an activity, desire to succeed in doing it, to perceive a warm 
glow or to increase the others welfare.  
In the middle of the two polar cases, both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation impact on the same 
variables (goods and leisure) with directions that could be opposing or alike.  
                                                 
3 See Bruno and Fiorillo (2009) for a theoretical model and an empirical investigation of intrinsic motivation role in 
volunteering. 
Meier and Stutzer (2008) have identified three kinds of intrinsic motivation. Their classification is here 
extended with a fourth kind of intrinsic motivation to better include the Benabou and Tirole 
framework. Furthermore, a different graduation of the relation between individual satisfaction and the 
other’s involvement is highlighted.  
1) Pleasure to perform the task. Strictly following the Deci definition4, the intrinsic motivation is 
the pleasure to do something and the opportunity to let own competence grow. Being linked to 
individual preferences and to the activity, the motivation is intrinsic both to the individual and 
to the activity. No other is involved. 
2) Desire to succeed in performing the task. From the Benanbou and Tirole perspective, “agent 
will undertake the task only if he has sufficient confidence in his own ability to succeed” 
(Benabou, Tirole, 2003, p. 491). Intrinsic motivation is identified with the probability to 
succeed, which in turn depends on the self-confidence of the agent, his ability and the difficulty 
of the task. It is intrinsic both to the individual and to the activity. Through the “looking glass 
self”, probability to succeed could be reinforced or crowded out by a principal that, supplying 
an extrinsic motivation, provides information on personal ability and/or the difficulty of the 
task. The extrinsic motivation may be an explicit reward or by a public acknowledgement.  
3) The warm glow. An impure form of altruism is what Andreoni (1990) defined the warm glow, 
to point out that people are often “motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, 
and other social and psychological objectives” (Olson, 1965). In this respect, motivation is 
individually generated, but needs an ex post social approval to be reinforced. Though warm 
glow is provided by the surrounding society, it has not an explicit formalisation other than a 
feeling, and it is intrinsic to the activity if a specific activity is preferred to others, also if the 
activity is exerted to obtain the warm glow. 
4) Social preferences. Social preferences can be interpreted as a category of intrinsic motivation if 
an individual has as objective not only his welfare but the other’s welfare too (Fehr, Fishbacker, 
2002). Individual choices are directed by an internal emotional objective that regards others 
welfare. In economic terms, the human behaviour is motivated both by his material wellness 
and by the others' welfare. Motivation is intrinsic to the individual, for it is embedded in his 
preferences. It could be not intrinsic to the activity. 
Moving from category 1 to 4, one can observe an increasing social involvement of the individual, from 
the pure individual gratification, to the need of being accepted at social level, to the other regarding 
preferences. Moreover, in the first category the intrinsic motivation is not related to the output 
dimension of the activity, and the intrinsic motivation is input oriented. In the last three categories the 
objective of intrinsic motivation is the output of the activity, instead that the activity itself and the 
intrinsic motivation is output oriented. 
 
3. Self esteem, self determination and locus of control 
 
The two psychological processes that are supposed to affect intrinsic motivations are impaired self 
determination and impaired self esteem. 
The first psychological process is well described by the Self determination theory (SDT) by Deci and 
Ryan (2000, 2007). Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) was presented by Deci and Ryan (1985) as a sub 
theory within SDT that had the aim of specifying factors that explain variability in intrinsic motivation 
and focus on the fundamental needs for competence and autonomy. According to CET, people must 
not only experience competence or efficacy, they must also experience their behaviour as self 
determined for intrinsic motivation to be in evidence. Motivation crowding out occurs when a reward 
affects perceived self determination, while the feeling of competence will not affect intrinsic motivation 
unless accompanied by a sense of autonomy (Deci, Ryan, 2000, p. 70). When individuals perceive an 
external intervention as reducing their self determination, intrinsic motivation is substituted by external 
control. Following Rotter (1966) the locus of control shifts from inside to outside (Frey, Jegen, cit., p. 
                                                 
4 “To be intrinsically motivated means to engage in an activity because the activity itself is interesting and enjoyable” (Deci 
et al. 2007, p. 12). 
594). Locus of control is a term in psychology that refers to individual beliefs about what causes the 
good or bad results in their life, either in general or in a specific area. It can either be internal (meaning 
the persons believe that they control themselves and their life) or external (meaning they believe that 
their environment, some higher power, or other people control their decisions and their life). Internals 
tend to attribute outcomes of events to their own control. Externals attribute outcomes of events to 
external circumstances. Weiner's early work (1974) suggested that, orthogonal to the internality-
externality dimension, we should also consider differences between those who attribute to stable 
causes, and those who attribute to unstable causes: ability (an internal stable cause), effort (an internal 
unstable cause), task difficulty (an external stable cause) or luck (an external, unstable cause). The self 
determination process is relevant in every category of intrinsic motivation objectives previously 
discussed. 
The second psychological process acts when outside intervention carries some information about 
personal competence or the difficulty of the task and it could be either supportive or discouraging. In 
the BT framework the direction of the self esteem mechanism relies on the private information of the 
performer, but also in a symmetric information framework, the self esteem mechanism has relevant 
implication for crowding out. 
Self esteem, considered in a specific dimension, reflects a person’s evaluation of his or her own worth 
in that activity, which in the definition of Branden (1969) derives from “the experience of being 
competent … and being worthy of happiness”. In the older definition of James (1890) self esteem is 
higher when there is coincidence between real self and ideal self. While self determination is always 
undermined by an external intervention, the self esteem mechanism can be supportive or discouraging, 
depending on the individual evaluation of his worth in that activity. Therefore, also self esteem is 
associated to the cognitive process where an individual claims his beliefs about what causes the good or 
bad results in their life, that is the locus of control. Self esteem can be reduced by the attribution of the 
results to external causes if individual experiences lower competence and worthiness, or supported 
when internal causes are highlighted. In more detail, if individuals experience results under their 
expectations feel low self esteem because their real self is smaller than their ideal self. In this situation, a 
reward shifting the locus from inside to outside, by reducing the role of competence, will increase their 
expectation. The reaction to a higher feeling of incompetence is a lower effort. The self esteem 
mechanism is then discouraging. On the other hand, individuals experimenting results over their 
expectations feel higher self esteem because the real self appears to be greater than their ideal self. A 
reward shifting the locus from inside to outside will decrease their expectation, but feeling very 
competent to the task and with a good self esteem, they will put more effort to counterbalance lower 
power against external factors. The self esteem mechanism is then supportive. 
The self esteem process is relevant in agent choice if the intrinsic motivation is performance related, 
because correspondence between ideal and real self has a role only when performance have to be 
measured. This happens in motivation categories 2, 3 and 4 above. The pleasure to perform the task 
should not be interested by this mechanism, simply because individual is not interested in his own 
performance. 
 
4. Model 
 
Discussion about intrinsic and extrinsic motivations shows that they concern the shape of the utility 
function and that they give a specific direction to human behaviour. Basically, depending on the 
different weight that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have in the preferences system, motivations 
direct behaviour toward different variables combination. Because we can observe only the resulting 
behaviour, not the decision-making process leading to it, it is difficult to discern how the overlapping 
motivations act on the same variables. If different motivations address to different objectives, it could 
be useful to distinguish in the utility function between intrinsic motivated goods and extrinsic 
motivated goods. Take as arguments of the utility function the amount of time one spends for intrinsic 
motivation and the amount performed for an extrinsic one. The same can be done for market 
expenditures (goods). The preferences are characterised by the weight that motivations have in 
individual behaviour. The utility function arguments are consumption goods (C), which contribute to 
higher material welfare (I feel good because I’ve got many assets) and the correspondent amount (D) 
that impacts on the emotional well being (I feel good because I’ve given many gifts, donations and so 
on). At the same way, time can be used to reach a material purpose (by consuming pure leisure T) or an 
intrinsically motivated objective (Y) which provides an output without any other explicit formalisation 
than a feeling, like the pleasure to perform a task, the desire to succeed in performing a task, the warm 
glow deriving from an activity or the others’ satisfaction deriving from an activity. In the present 
terminology, if an external intervention undermines self determination (shifts the locus from internal to 
external), intrinsic motivation is less in evidence and has a weaker impact in directing behaviour (the 
intrinsic motivated good has a lower weight among objectives). The crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation emerges, if with growing external intervention (i.e. with higher rewards) individual reduces 
his effort in pursuing intrinsic objectives. 
In order to consider the most general framework where all the four categories can be embedded, leisure 
time used for intrinsic motivation is considered as an input to produce a generic motivated output, like 
the pleasure to perform a task, the desire to succeed in performing a task, the warm glow deriving from 
an activity or the others’ satisfaction deriving from an activity. Therefore, to produce the motivated 
output Y, individual spends time A in the activity.  
Denote γ the weight intrinsic motivation has in directing individual behaviour and 1-γ the 
corresponding weight of extrinsic motivation, parameters describing the individual preferences. A 
Cobb Douglas utility function is summarised in (1). 
U = CT[ ]1−γ Y A,K h,k( )( )D γ          (1) 
s.t. 
Tx = T + A + L
D + C = wL + X + hwA
 
where L is labour time, w is wage, X is non labour income. 
According to the locus of control theory, each individual has an external-internal belief on what 
influences his performance Y. Let denote K the individual belief that internal variables influence Y 
(locus of control). CET Theory states that intrinsic motivation is much in evidence if individual can 
experience some autonomy. When individuals perceive an external intervention as reducing their self 
determination, intrinsic motivation is substituted by external control. To include the effect on locus of 
control of an external intervention represented by a reward, consider K as a function of two distinct 
factors: the individual inclination for internal locus k and the control effect on self determination represented 
by a reward, so that Y(A,K(h, k)), where 0<h<1 is the ratio of the reward with respect to wage. Given 
an individual locus k, when h increases, its effect on self determination reduces K, and the locus of 
control moves from inside to outside. This reward effect makes intrinsic motivation less evident in its 
effect on human behaviour. Assume that in the individual belief K the control effect is represented by 
the mark up of wage on reward. 
Assumption 1: K = β(1− h)α , ∂K (h, k)
∂k
> 0  
The Assumption states that the control effect of increasing rewards has a negative impact on self 
determination and that the external intervention is always perceived as reducing self determination. 
This could be not always true, but it is useful to show how motivation could be crowded in, also in the 
worst hypothesis. Moreover, the marginal effect of h on K depends on the coefficient α. With α=1 every 
reward increase reduces internal belief at the same way. If α>1 growing rewards undermine the internal 
locus more than proportionally. Decreasing reductions of locus appear if α<1. All these alternatives 
seem reasonable in different ways and will be discussed. These alternatives can be discussed as different 
degrees of self determination sensitivity to rewards. Finally, the individual inclination for internal locus has a 
positive effect on self determination. 
Assumption 2:  
∂Y A,K h, k( )( )
∂A
> 0,
∂Y A, K h,k( )( )
∂K
> 0   
The Assumption states that the individual belief that internal variables influence Y, i.e. self 
determination, has a positive impact on the motivated object Y. Consequently, from assumption 1 
derives that the individual inclination for internal locus has a positive effect on the motivated object: 
individuals with higher internal locus of control tend to attribute outcomes of events to their own 
control and feel higher self determination; this enhances the satisfaction coming from intrinsic 
motivated activity. On the other hand, if the control effect of increasing rewards has a negative impact on 
self determination, higher rewards will correspond to lower levels of the motivated object Y. Finally, 
more time spent in the activity increases the production of the motivated good. 
 
4.1.  General framework 
 
The implicit form for the motivated output can be itemized for the conceptual categories expressed 
above. Nevertheless, it could be useful as first step to disentangle the implications of the most general 
form. Denote εYA  the elasticity of the motivated good with respect to time spent in the motivated 
activity. 
Proposition 1: When a motivated good is produced through time spent in the activity, the optimal 
amount of time spent in the activity is lower than a standard leisure time. 
Proof: The optimal value for A is given in (2) 
A* =
wTx + X( )
2w(1− h)
γεYA
2 − γ + γεYA
         (2) 
while if A would be directly the motivated output the optimal value would be as in the special case, 
where εYA =1,  
A* = A = γ (wTx + X)
2w(1− h)          (2)
 
that is greater than (2) for any positive elasticity. 
In a standard Cobb Douglas function, the exponent represents the fraction of income devoted to each 
good. If the motivated good is produced through A, the weight of the motivated object will be γεYA  
and the amount of income used for A will be the second fraction in (2). It is worthwhile to note that 
this ratio represents how motivation works as a factor that pushes the individual to perform a specific 
activity. The motivation, taken as a dynamic factor that directs behaviour, has an individual component 
(the exponent) and an objective component (the elasticity) depending on the kind of motivated object 
and on the functional form of the motivated object production. Consequently, the intensity and the 
direction of motivation depend on the role of self-determination and locus in the motivated object 
production. If A increases Y of the same proportion the motivated output, it quite coincides with the 
motivated time spent to produce it. Time spent in the motivated activity is determined as fixed amount 
of potential income divided by its price, where the proportion is γ/2. In this case, the agent sets the 
amount of time to devote to the motivated good production just as leisure time. 
 
Proposition 2: 
a) If εYA  is constant both with respect to the reward and the time spent in the activity, the optimal 
value of time spent in the production of the motivated object is a fixed amount of potential 
income. The control effect does not crowd out time spent in the motivated activity.  
b) If 
 
εYA  is constant with respect to the time spent into the activity, but it varies with reward, 
crowding out could emerge if the percentage variation of A weight in individual utility is 
negative and greater than the percentage variation of the cost of the motivated activity. 
If the marginal effect of self determination on the motivated good is constant, the relative price effect 
described by Frey and Goette (1999) gives a proportional variation in A. If the elasticity of the 
motivated object is constant to reward variations, for every reward increase the positive price effect acts 
increasing A. Being the marginal production of the motivated object invariant to reward, the control 
effect acts directly on the pleasure deriving from Y: the individual will be less happy when the control 
effect is at work, but he is not induced to reduce effort in the motivated good because A reductions has 
no benefit in terms of greater productivity. A increases at the same percent variation of price effect and 
the reduction of satisfaction deriving from the control effect cannot be offset by A variations  
If the control effect has a positive influence on the elasticity of the motivated object, A increases both 
by price effect and control effect. If the control effect reduces the marginal production of the 
motivated object, but the percentage variation is in absolute value smaller than the corresponding 
variation of the price effect, the crowding in still emerges.  
From the general framework analysis it appears that the crowding out basically depends on the elasticity 
of the motivated output and on the effect of self determination on it. In more details, if self 
determination does not influence the productivity of A and its elasticity is constant, individual could be 
less happy but he is not induced to lower effort, because A reductions has no benefit in terms of 
greater productivity. If the elasticity of the motivated object is constant with respect to the time spent 
into the activity, but decreases with reward, the self determination process weakens the efficacy of time 
spent in the motivated activity and crowding out could emerge. When the general framework is detailed 
for the different categories of intrinsically motivated goods, additional distinctions can be highlighted. 
Taking into account different mechanism of self-determination, it can be shown that the intrinsic 
motivation input oriented produces very different path from intrinsic motivation output oriented because of 
the different role of self-esteem mechanism. 
 
5. Pleasure to do 
 
When intrinsic motivation concerns the pleasure to do something and the opportunity to let own 
competence grow, individual is interested only in doing the activity and learning by it. His satisfaction, 
and then the motivated object, does not depend on the difficulty of the task or on her ability to 
perform it, as would happen if he was interested in the good result of his activity. As previously 
discussed, the self esteem mechanism, being supportive or discouraging, has no role in the pleasure 
resulting from the activity, as would be for making jogging in the morning, reading a book, listening 
music or having sex.  
The self determination process could imply crowding out of effort spent in the motivated activity, 
depending on how the pleasure to do something varies with different degree of self determination 
sensitivity. Two situations can be distinguished: 
a)  Self determination of pleasure. If self determination directly supports the pleasure to do 
something, individual feels autonomy as a part of his pleasure (I’m pleased in doing that by 
myself);  
b) Self determination of competence. If self determination supports the efficacy of his action 
(the productivity in terms of pleasure of his effort), individual experiences competence or 
efficacy as self determined and they grow with growing self determination (I’m pleased in doing 
that and I’m able to do it by myself). 
Though it seems that the second definition is closer to CET theory, both alternatives will be discussed. 
Moreover, a different sensitivity of self determination to rewards can be analysed in these alternative 
situations. 
 
a) Self determination of pleasure  
If self determination undermines the pleasure deriving from the time spent in the motivated activity, 
but for any reward and any level of effort the same percent increase of pleasure occurs (the elasticity 
described in Proposition 2.a), then the price effect always determines a proportional increase in A and 
the control effect reduces the pleasure deriving from A, but variations of effort cannot offset it. A 
proportional relation between the individual belief K and the motivated output would be the case, as 
forY = KAα , for any value ofα. In other words, it does not matter how much self determination is 
sensible to reward variations. This happens because the marginal impact of self determination on 
pleasure is independent from self determination itself. Because it is irrelevant if self determination is 
high or low, any reward variation gives a proportional variation of pleasure.  
When self determination proportionally reduces the pleasure to do something, the intrinsic motivation 
is not crowded out by a reward increase because the price effect makes effort cheaper and control 
effect undermine pleasure but does not makes effort less productive. Consider as motivated output 
reading books. My father gives me a reward for any hour spent in reading books. I feel my self-
determination threatened, because I’d be happier reading without reward, but the marginal pleasure 
deriving from reading is always the same. As a whole, taking into account that with higher reward I can 
purchase more books, I’ll spend more time reading books. 
 
b) Self determination of competence 
An exponential form gives different results. Consider that pleasure to do is given by Y = AK .The 
elasticity has the characteristic described in Proposition 2 and then crowding out could emerge 
depending on the sensitivity of self determination to reward variations (that is the α value). It easy to 
show that for any α <1 or equal, the crowding in still emerges. While low sensitivity to reward does not 
crowd out effort, with higher self determination sensitivity, i.e. for α=1/k, the intrinsic motivation can 
be crowded out depending on the values of h, k, and γ. If α=1/k, for any k<1/2 agent will be always 
crowded out, while for higher internal inclinations there will be increasing effort in the activity with low 
rewards that will disappear when too higher rewards are proposed. The threshold reward increases with 
higher motivation as shown in Figure 1. 
A* 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
3
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h 
Figure 1 – Motivation crowding of self determination of competence 
 
If self determination reduces the marginal pleasure to do something, and the self determination process 
is highly sensitive to reward variation, the intrinsic motivation could be crowded out by a reward 
increase because the price effect makes effort cheaper but, at the same time, the control effect make it 
less productive and the two effects conflict. Consider as motivated output having sex with someone. 
Which effect will have a payment for every appointment? If I feel that my self-determination is 
threatened, it is reasonable that my marginal pleasure in each appointment is lessened because I feel 
that my efficacy is not self determined. Than, it could happen that I’ll reduce my appointments when 
she offers very high reward. 
 
An additive relation like Y=K+A would imply that the pleasure to do something would be positive also 
if I do nothing at all. Seemingly unreasonable, it will not be considered. 
Above discussion has shown that when an individual is intrinsically motivated to do something because 
the activity itself is interesting and enjoyable, he could be crowded in/out depending on how self 
determination is linked to the pleasure to do and on its sensitivity to rewards.  
 
6. Probability to succeed 
 
If individual is intrinsically motivated to succeed in performing a task, the motivated object is the desire 
to succeed. In this situation the intrinsic motivation is output oriented.  
When the motivated good is the probability to succeed, one must take into account the locus of control 
role because the probability to succeed is an expectation about Y, based on the personal belief about 
the functional relation determining Y. Y is a function of internal variables if it depends on ability (S), an 
internal stable cause, and time devoted to the activity (A), an internal unstable cause. On the other side, 
the variables determining Y are external if the functional relation is Y(θ, σ), where θ represents task 
simplicity (stable) and σ good luck (unstable). Each variable has a positive effect on Y. Rotter (1975) 
cautioned that internality and externality represent two ends of a continuum, not an either/or typology. 
When the motivated good is the probability to succeed, the motivated good is an expected value E(Y), 
based on the individual belief K that internal variables influence Y.  
E(Y ) = KAS + (1− K )σθ           (3) 
where to simplify algebra Y(θ, σ)= θσ and Y(S,A)=SA. Note that the inverse relation between locus of 
control and reward does not always imply a reduction of E(Y), depending on the contribution of 
internal and external causes to the production5. Moreover, when the motivated object is the probability 
to succeed, YAε  varies both with time spent in the activity and with reward, so that Proposition 2 is no 
more applicable. Finally, the proportional relation between the self determination parameter K and the 
contribution of internal variables AS is equivalent to the self determination of pleasure framework of 
the previous paragraph, where sensitivity to reward (α) is not influential for crowding direction and 
crowding in always appears. 
As previously discussed the self esteem mechanism comes into evidence in shaping utility, when 
motivation is output oriented. Because the derivative of E(Y) with respect to K is positive if AS>σθ, 
satisfaction grows with the probability to succeed if internal variables are (perceived) more relevant 
than the external ones. With a given amount of effort, a growing reward will shift the locus from inside 
to outside (the self determination process), giving more weight to the external variables, but the 
probability to succeed will grow if the internal variables weight is greater than that of the external ones. 
The relation between equilibrium value of internal and external variables gives evidence to the self 
esteem mechanism. Individuals feel high self esteem if experience a real self greater than their ideal self. 
In analytical terms, this implies that in equilibrium they choose a level of effort corresponding to an 
ideal self (their belief about the probability to succeed) smaller than the result really affordable by 
exerting that level of effort, that is simply A*S. 
KA * S + (1− K )σθ < A * S → A * S > σθ → ∂E(Y )
∂K
> 0       (5) 
For any level of self determination, a reward that shifts the locus from inside to outside will decrease 
their expectation, making more evident the positive experience of self esteem. The self esteem 
mechanism is then supportive and enhances to exert more effort. 
On the other hand, the probability to succeed will decrease if the self esteem mechanism is 
discouraging, when the internal variables weight is lower than that of the external ones.  
KA * S + (1− K )σθ > A * S → A * S < σθ → ∂E(Y )
∂K
< 0       (6) 
Individuals, who have an ideal self greater than their real self, experiment decreasing self esteem. A 
reward, shifting the locus from inside to outside, will increase their expectation, confirming that their 
competence is not so important in determining results. The self esteem mechanism is then discouraging 
The optimal value for A is  
 
A * = 
γ w T x + X ( ) 
2 w ( 1− h ) − 
2 − γ 
2 
σ θ 
S
1 − K 
K  if        (7) 
 =0 otherwise 
where the first addend is the standard leisure time in (2) and the second addend represents the 
perceived weight of external variables in the production of the motivated good. The derivative of A* 
with respect to the reward is: 
∂A *
∂h =
γ (wTx + X)
2w(1− h)2 +
σθ
S
K '
K 2
1− γ
2




        (8) 
                                                 
5 The derivative of E(y) with respect to K is positive if σθ<AS. 
A* is increasing in h, through substitution and income effects6 (in the first addend, the price effect) and 
decreasing through the external effect (second addend), representing the perceived weight of exogenous 
factors (θ and σ) in the production of the motivated good. A growing reward reduces the opportunity 
cost of intrinsic goods with respect to the extrinsic ones, increasing A, through price effect, and 
increases the weight (reduces autonomy) of exogenous factors, reducing A, through external effect. 
Note that the external effect modifies A through two channels: a negative direct external effect, due to the 
share of motivated good production that is independent from A and exogenously determined by task 
difficulty and luck; and a positive indirect external effect, capturing how exogenous “endowment” of Y is 
redistributed between goods. The total external effect is always negative on A, because redistribution of 
exogenous “endowment” is spread over all intrinsic and extrinsic goods and only a part (γ/2) of 
exogenous contribution to Y is redistributed on A. While internal locus reduces total external effect, 
the intrinsic motivation has a positive effect both on the indirect part of external effect (the positive 
one) and on the price effect. Therefore, a more intensive motivation, by increasing the positive impact 
of external factors, reduces the overall negative impact of external effect. Intuition behind this result 
relies on the different role of intrinsic motivation and locus of control. Locus determines if the effect of 
external variables on intrinsic activity is strong or weak, while the absolute weight of intrinsic activity 
depends on motivation.  
The crowding in condition in is shown in (9).  
 
γ
2 − γ( )
(wT
x
+ X )
w
S
σθ
>
α
β 1− h( )
1−α
         (9) 
where the lhs is the ratio between the contribution of internal and external variables to the probability 
to succeed, when time spent in the activity is set as a standard leisure time. The relative contribution of 
internal/external variables is a key factor in determining crowding direction because it describe the 
proportion between the agent’s contribution to the probability (the time he would spend in the activity 
without locus and productivity implications) and the contribution of external variables: a strongly 
motivated individual, with high competence in the task and higher potential income, would resist to the 
undermining effect of rewards better than someone with low levels of competence, motivation and 
income; at the same time the same individual, facing different kind of activities, could be crowded out 
more easily in a simpler task or in a lucky situation than when the activity is very difficult or unlucky 
conditions occur. The rationale for this is in the self esteem mechanism. In a difficult task, the agent 
chooses a higher effort because has a lower expectation of success. A greater increase of self esteem 
will come back by comparing expectations and results. Consequently, in an unlucky or difficult task, the 
reward appears as a support to self esteem because, by shifting the locus from inside to outside, further 
reduces the expectation in a situation where individual has experienced competence. The reaction is 
higher effort. 
A reward offered in a very simply task, instead, is perceived as discouraging for it is not proportional to 
the task; where agent expects easy situations puts lower effort and has higher expectations. The results 
are more frequently under his expectations. The reward further decrease the role of competence he 
perceives and effort is reduced. In this perspective the Benabou and Tyrole framework gives further 
implications if two conditions for crowding out occur, that is when “the agent is less knowledgeable in 
some dimensions than the principal” and “the principal must be more inclined to offer a reward when 
the agent has limited ability or the task is unattractive” (Benabou and Tyrole, p.492). In the present 
framework, also with symmetric information crowding out may occur, nor specific preferences of the 
principal have to be modelled. The uncertainty works through the individual locus of control and the 
crowding out emerge if the locus decreases with external intervention.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Substitution and income effect have the same sign. If A is a secondary activity with respect to labour, the opportunity cost 
of A is the difference between wage and reward. With increasing rewards, the opportunity cost decreases and the 
substitution effect has a positive sign 
6.1. Different degrees of self determination sensitivity 
 
Just as for the hypothesis of the pleasure to do, also when the probability to succeed is the motivated 
good, the self determination sensitivity plays an important role while describing the effect of rewards. 
Denote A0 =
γ (wTx + X )
2w
 the standard leisure time in (3) for h=0 and B =
σθ
S
1 − γ
2



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. The crowding 
in condition (9) is simplified in: 
A0
B
>
α
β 1− h( )
1−α
 
Consider the simplest form of K, with α≤1 and β=1. The right hand side of crowding condition is 
decreasing in h or independent from it. The α=1 hypothesis in Assumption 1 implies that any reward 
increase reduces (increases) internal (external) belief at the same way. The α<1 hypothesis implies a 
reduction of locus less than proportional. Therefore, the crowding direction strictly depends on the 
value of A0 (the effort without reward) and the relation between internal and external factors, that is on 
the self esteem mechanism. The exogenous variables (psychological and economic) univocally 
determine the crowding direction and the size of reward is irrelevant. If α=1 the condition in (9) with 
the equality sign could be rewritten as A0 = B . In this situation, A does not vary with growing rewards: 
the agent always exerts the level of effort corresponding to no reward, because the self esteem support 
exactly counterbalances the undermined self determination. For A0 > B , individual will be always 
crowded in, because a more supportive self esteem always offsets a lower self determination, while the 
crowding out will occur if the opposite is verified, because self esteem and self determination have the 
same direction. For α<1 lower levels of A0 are needed to obtain the same results. It should be noted 
that, in the pleasure to do framework, the agent would have been always crowded in, both with 
proportional and decreasing self determination sensitivity, both in the self determination of pleasure 
and in the self determination of competence hypothesis, because the self esteem mechanism is ruled 
out when the motivated good is input oriented.  
For the same self determination sensitivity (α=1), but with β=k, the right hand side of crowding 
condition in becomes equal to 1/k and the crowding condition is still independent of h. This 
combination of hypothesis allows us to deeply discuss the influence of psychological attitudes on 
motivation crowding. Consider the combinations of locus of control and intrinsic motivation that allow 
respectively the crowding out or the crowding in situations. Couples of γ and k that ensure a stable 
value of A are described by the following equation. 
k = w(2 − γ )σθ
γ (wTx + X)S
           (10) 
that is decreasing in γ, as in Figure 2. With increasing rewards, individuals with high intrinsic motivation 
could reduce time in intrinsic motivated activity if their natural locus of control k is relatively low. They 
easily perceive that reward attempt to their autonomy, because they are not self determined and they 
attribute outcomes of events to external circumstances: a growing reward, that is external, intensifies 
this attribution. At the opposite, internals will intensify effort in the activity with increasing rewards, 
also with lower intrinsic motivation, because they are highly confident in their own ability and they 
perceive growing rewards as an assessment of it.   
On the other hand, individuals highly motivated will be crowded in, unless of a low locus of control. 
They give much weight to intrinsic motivated production, independently from the factors determining 
it. The strongly motivated individual faces an increasing reward as an enlargement of his income 
possibility to consume it, through the price effect and through the indirect external effect, intensifying 
effort in production. 
Figure 2 – Psychological characteristics and crowding effects  
 
Wage and non-wage income will determine different situations for agents with same psychological 
characteristic. Graphically, a higher wage will shift the curve upward, while higher non-labour income 
downward. Individuals with higher non-labour income, due the income effect, will experiment 
crowding in, while individuals with lower non-labour income are crowded out. 
 
Finally, the hypothesis that self determination sensitivity implies growing reduction of locus can be 
discussed (α>1). Consider α=1/k and β=1. The crowding condition is expressed by 
A0
B
>
1
k
1
1− h



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1− k
k
           (11) 
When the self determination sensitivity implies growing reduction of locus, the appearance of crowding 
out depends both on the size of the reward and on the ratio between internal and external variables, 
reflecting the self esteem mechanism. Higher individual inclination for internal locus will make 
individual more resistant to the undermining effects of rewards, higher intrinsic motivation will do the 
same. The crowding out would occur, when lower rewards are offered, also for low potential income 
individuals or when activity entails easy task, depending on the relative strength of locus and intrinsic 
motivation 
  
7. The principal’s profit as object of intrinsic motivation 
 
As discussed above, psychological literature suggests that motivation crowding out occurs when a 
reward affects perceived self determination. The perception of external intervention (K) has been 
expressed as a function of the size of reward, while the individual psychological characteristic is 
represented by the individual locus of control (k). Other conditions may alter the perception intensity 
of external intervention.  Harvey (cit) has showed that extrinsic rewards might be perceived as 
controlling if two conditions occur: a large size of the reward and the coincidence between the object 
of an agent’s intrinsic motivation and the source of his rewards. The first condition has been discussed 
above, while the second needs a slight modification of the objective of intrinsic motivation.  
In the proposed classification of intrinsic motivations, social preferences can be interpreted as a 
category of intrinsic motivation if an individual has as objective not only his welfare but the other’s 
welfare too. If a social preference is the source of intrinsic motivation, utility will be a direct function of 
other’s utility.  
U = CT( )1−γ UoD( )γ   
where Uo is the other’s utility. The condition described by Harvey is a special case of intrinsic 
motivation induced by social preferences, where Uo is the principal’s profit. The social preferences 
framework has been modelled by Sliwka (2007), with selfish agents compared with fair agents, who care 
for the principal’s payoff, and conformist agents, who behave alternatively as selfish or fair, depending 
on how the largest fraction of population behave. Asymmetric information is assumed about the type 
of the agent and the distribution of types in the population. A social preferences hypothesis is also in 
Bolle and Otto (2010), where a linear relation between individual utility and others’ utility is assumed. 
The intrinsic motivation to other’s welfare depends on the value of the good the other receives and not 
on the good itself: because the individual estimation of this value is assumed higher than the signal he 
learns from the reward, the crowding out could occur if the signal is too low. 
Just as for the probability to succeed, the intrinsic motivation is directed toward the result of the 
activity. The agent has an expectation about his performance based on the personal belief about the 
functional relation determining his principal’s payoff. Uo is a function of internal variables if it depends 
on ability and time devoted to the activity, minus the reward the agent perceives. On the other side, the 
variables determining Uo are external if the principal’s profit depends on task simplicity and good luck. 
The principal’s payoff is described in (12) 
U0 = K AS − hwA( )+ 1− K( )σθ         (12) 
 Consider again the simplest form of K, with α=1 and β=1. The optimal value for A is 
A* = γ (wTm + X)
2w 1 − h( ) −
h
(1− h)(S − hw)






(2 − γ )θσ
2
      (13)
 
where time devoted to the activity is increasing in h if 
  
γ (wTm + X)S
w 2 − γ( )σθ >
(S − h2w)S
S − wh[ ]2         (14)
 
The above condition for crowding in has the same left hand side of the corresponding condition for 
the probability to succeed. Compared with the probability to succeed hypothesis, with a constant self 
determination sensitivity, an internal highly motivated, that in that hypothesis would be crowded in for 
any reward, will be still crowded in with very low rewards. With growing control, the agent who has a 
stake in principal’s payoff will be crowded out. The explanation for an easier crowding out relies again 
on the self esteem mechanism. Also where the reward is perceived as supportive, because the agent 
experiments results over his expectations, an additional effect of reward must be taken into account. By 
reducing the principal’s payoff, the reward acts directly on the internal variables contribution: it reduces 
their perceived weight, through undermined self determination, but reduces also their real weight, 
through a higher cost for principal. While the expectation is reduced proportionally to the self 
determination parameter, the real self is reduced of the whole higher cost. Consequently, the real self 
(the principal’s payoff) decreases with growing rewards, faster than the ideal self, because of the 
imperfect psychological perception. An individual experiencing high self esteem with low rewards, can 
experiment low self esteem with higher rewards because he underestimates the role of costs in profit 
function.  
This result is quite similar to the results reported in Harvey (cit), where a higher reward is a condition 
for crowding out, but with a different explanation. The perfect substitutability between intrinsic and 
extrinsic objectives, in Harvey framework, shifts choices from intrinsic to extrinsic behaviour, because 
individuals choose to behave “as if” being intrinsic or extrinsic motivated according to the situation 
that gives a higher welfare. The size of the reward is determinant for the shift from one objective to 
another. In the Sliwka (2007) signalling game, the trust/control strategy of the principal is not related to 
the reward size and the conformist agent choose to behave “as if” being selfish or fair by learning the 
prevailing social norm. Bolle and Otto (2010) find that the reward size is relevant for crowding out 
because the individual estimation of the value of goods is substituted by the (lower) market signal when 
a reward is offered. The subjective psychological attitude toward the other is replaced by a market 
evaluation.  
Here, individual intrinsic motivation can be more or less enlightened by the simultaneous work of self 
determination and self esteem mechanism, but the motivation is not ruled out by an opportunity 
evaluation of benefits deriving from the motivated action. In other words, intrinsic motivation is 
considered as a psychological attitude of the individual, exogenous to the economic behaviour, where it 
can become more or less evident. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
Taking into account that intrinsic motivation is a psychological issue whose relevance in economics has 
already been addressed, the paper presents a model where some relevant psychological mechanism are 
explicitly modelled in order to explain how the self esteem and the self determination mechanisms 
affect the intrinsic motivation. The analysis is based on the distinction among different kind of 
objectives of the intrinsic motivation. If an activity is engaged just for the pleasure to perform the 
activity itself, with low self determination sensitivity to the reward, the agent will be always crowded in. 
With higher sensitivity, the crowding out would not still emerge, unless the self determination process 
is relevant for the marginal productivity of pleasure, that is when the self determination enlightens the 
role of intrinsic motivation by putting in evidence individual competence.  
When the agent is motivated to succeed in performing a task, the self esteem effect of good or bad 
performance must be taken into account. Also with low degrees of self determination sensitivity a 
constant crowding out could emerge if individual experience very low self esteem. Finally, when 
individual is motivated to pursue the principal’s payoff, more occasions for crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation may occur because of the imperfect estimation of the cost effect on principal’s profit, that 
progressively undermines his self esteem. 
Throughout the model, the intrinsic motivation is assumed as an exogenous psychological attitude that 
can be more or less highlighted in economic behaviour. Differently from some previous models, 
intrinsic motivation is not a matter of economic choice where individuals choose to behave as intrinsic 
(altruistic) or extrinsic (selfish), according to the best payoff they can afford.  
Further research is needed to define the variability of self determination sensitivity or its better 
functional form, but the distinction among different kind of motivated objectives can be useful to 
distinguish the effects of rewards, with a given sensitivity. The theoretical framework here proposed 
can be tested in experiments that should take into account the above distinction. 
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